

Bureaucratic Efficiency and Democratic Accountability: Conflict or Compatibility¹

Abstract

There is a rising concern that the traditional mechanisms used to ensure bureaucratic efficiency and accountability of public service have been eroded as a result of organizational structuring, complexities of governmental structure, and a blurry distinction between politics and administration. Bureaucracy has now become a focal point of criticism not only for its extensive power but also for its waste and mismanagement of resources, its obscurity in decision-making process, and its insulation from political control. Public outcry about inefficiency, red taped, detailed rules and regulations, and impersonalization of treatment bear the testimony of the growing distance between the people and bureaucratic organizations. The author argues that classical and contemporary models of accountability and theoretically and empirically inadequate to provide a justifiable framework that could ensure the attainment of bureaucratic and democratic accountability at the same time. In postulating this argument, the author will rely heavily upon qualitative analysis of the relevant literature.

“Administrative action in any political system, but especially in democracy, must somehow realize two objectives simultaneously. It is necessary to construct and maintain administrative capacity, and it is equally necessary to control it in order to ensure the responsiveness of the public bureaucracy to higher authority.” (Garvey, 1995)

Introduction

Ensuring effective accountability is a very important question in the public sector. There is a rising concern that the traditional mechanism used to ensure bureaucratic efficiency and accountability of public service have been eroded as a result of organizational reforms, complexities of governmental structure, and a blurry distinction between the public and private sectors, especially the emergence of quasi-government enterprises (Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, and Pettigrew, 1996). Public service has undergone businesslike transformation amidst the influence of globalization. Contemporary changes such as deregulation, privatization, and liberalization have become a new genre of administrative reforms in Belgium, Brazil, Finland, Germany, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Zambia (Haque, 1998a; Nunberg, 1997; OECD, 1995). These reforms were introduced in order to overcome bureaucratic inefficiency, budget deficit, monopoly, lower quality service, and customer dissatisfaction (Clements, 1994; Kelegama, 1995).

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However, critics point out that these reforms have failed to achieve their objectives and in some cases have even diminished the degree of accountability and the level of public trust (Haque, 2001). In Norway, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, there is a continuing crisis of public confidence in relation to “the institutional integrity and representativeness of public governance.” (OECD, 1996) In the United States, the level of trust in government has declined measurably for the past forty years (Gordon and Milakovich, 1998). In Canada and Norway, public trust in government institutions has declined steadily (Christensen, 1997; Landry, 1993). While these empirical observations clearly manifest the growing distrust of public agencies in advanced capitalist countries, the trend of diminishing public trust has also been witnessed in many developing nations. In Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, the opinion polls taken during the second half of the 1990s clearly indicated a growing public discontent toward public sector reform, especially its impact on poverty, corruption, and social welfare (Rotella, 1997) Similarly, recent empirical studies suggest that public confidence in various government services in Bangladesh has declined (Zafarullah, Khan, and Rahman, 1997). Meanwhile, the public perception of the civil service in the Philippines has been negative and cynical and in Korea, majority of its citizens view their bureaucrats as “less than ethical.” (Endrigo, 1997; Kim, 1997)

In fact, there is an extent of literature that criticizes the inherent obstacles of public service such as its “accumulation of excessive power, lack of accountability and representation, indifference towards public needs and demands, and official secrecy and inaccessibility.” (Garnhanm, 1990; Haque, 1994) Bureaucracy has become a focal point of criticism not only for its extensive power but also for its waste and mismanagement of resources, its obscurity in decision-making process, and its insulation from political control. Public outcry about inefficiency, red tape, detailed rules and regulations, and impersonalization of treatment are all testimony of the growing distance between the people and their governing institutions (Meier, 1993b; Mosher, 1982; Redford, 1969; Ripley and Franklin, 1991; and Rourke, 1992).

There is a general consensus that the mere existence of various institutions of public accountability is not enough; they have to be effective in protecting the interests of the public. This is because the quality of governance is determined not by the objective perceptions of a few experts but by the net impact of government policies on the well-beings of its citizens (Shah, 1996; Huther and Shah, 1998) Governance quality is thus enhanced by closely matching government services with citizen preferences as well as by moving government closer to the people they are supposed to serve, something that ensures greater accountability of the public service. In recent years there has been a proliferation of concern on the consequences of governance and misgovernance (Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999). For example, few empirical studies have demonstrated the link between accountability and performance. Wade (1994) finds that when irrigation officials in India and Korea face more local pressure, they tend to perform better than traditional arrangements that insulate them from political pressure. In addition, Isham, Narayan, and Pritchett (1995) reveal that aid-financed rural water supply projects performed much better with greater participation from their beneficiaries.

A wealth of cross-country indicators of various aspects of governance now strongly suggest that good governance improves government accountability to citizens and enhances quality of public services (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, 2000).

Out of all these concerns has come a renewed interest in protecting democratic values as they pertain to control of government agencies. The growth of public agencies has forced theories and practitioners to revisit bureaucratic paradigms such as fairness, representation, participation, accountability, responsiveness, political neutrality, efficiency, rationality, and expertise. Yet, the very nature of public administration poses problems to accommodate these values. For example, bureaucracy consists of appointed public officials and has a tendency to rely on expertise and knowledge over accountability, participation, and democratic control (Weber, 1968; Mosher, 1968). In addition, their lack of accountability at the ballot box as well as various civil service regulations that insulate them from political pressure further compound the fear that bureaucratic power comes at the expense of public interest (Krislov and Rosenbloom, 1981).

As a result, the rise of bureaucratic power creates undue strains upon democratic government. Political scientists and public administrators have long talked about bureaucratic despotism. In Britain, as early as 1887, Sir Stafford Northcote expressed his fear of the power of bureaucracy (Kingsley, 1944). In his examination of the British political system, Kingsley concurs that bureaucratic despotism is bound to occur when the “permanent officials will take the management of affairs into their own hands, and Parliament will have little to do.” In America, Wilson (1887) raised a serious concern when it comes to the political power of administration. His principal solicitude was that bureaucracies in a democratic state must be able to accommodate the constitutional and political principles of democracy. In addition, Max Weber feared that bureaucracy might be incompatible with democracy as unelected senior civil servants not only shape and determine public policies they also implement them (Yishai and Cohen, 1997). As a result, they decide who gets what (Dogan, 1975), when, and how (Lasswell, 1958). Mosher (1982) aptly articulates this problem: “How does one square a permanent (and we would add, powerful) civil service—which neither the people by their vote nor their representatives by their appointments can readily replace—with the principle of government ‘by the people’?” Later scholars continued to express their apprehension on the danger of bureaucratic power.

Hence, the essence of traditional public administration that tends to be rigid, rule bound, centralized, insular, self protective, and profoundly antidemocratic has often collided with the contemporary paradigm of bureaucracy that “allows qualified voters an efficient instrument through which the will of the people may be expressed; makes officers both responsive and responsible,” and ensures the common welfare (Lynn, 2001). Therefore, there is a constant struggle between emphasizing traditional administrative values and upholding democratic principles.

Given the centrality of the accountability debate and its relation to democratic legitimacy, it may be helpful to make explicit of the evolution of various models of accountability in detail. These models clearly delineate the positions of government in its attempt to balance the two competing values. While these models have basically become part of the organizational theory, yet they do not appear to solve the dilemmas facing many public administrators today. The new movements in public administration theory and practices revolve around finding the alternative to those models. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to systematically examine the extent to which progress toward reconciling bureaucratic efficiency and democratic accountability has been advanced. The first part will address how the traditional public administration attempts to reconcile this dilemma. Secondly, I will delve into post-traditional intellectual developments and examine how this movement provides a framework for achieving a balance between administrative capacity and democratic accountability. Finally, I will illuminate how emerging administrative theories attempt to reconcile this dilemma. In undertaking this analysis, I argue that the existing literature is theoretically and empirically inadequate to provide a framework that could ensure the legitimacy of bureaucracy in a democratic state. My argument is essentially based upon selective consideration of the public administration literature, although I am the first to admit that relying altogether on literature is not always satisfactory. This is quite apparent especially when my interpretation of the views might at times appear to be inconsistent. Karl (1976) postulates that the selection of a particular literature may owe as much to the prestige a particular author confers to the field rather than his intellectual merit.

Traditional Administrative Paradigms

Woodrow Wilson's essay (1887) is perhaps the first conscious attempt to point out the difficulties faced by public agencies. He argued that politicians needed to delegate power to administrators because the former could not possibly cope with the complexities of government programs. The increasing role of the bureaucracy and its emphasis on expertise and professionalism with respect to policy matters make it more difficult for the legislative branch to scrutinize every detail of enacted policies. By relying upon bureaucracies to exercise their discretion to shape policies as they see fit, how can we assume that those policies are responsive to the public interest? Wilson's theory of separation of politics and administration and its underlying principle of technical expertise and political neutrality provides the answer to that question especially in his emphasis on the pursuit of efficiency as the goal of organization without threatening democracy and accountability. According to Wilson, the hierarchical form of accountability in which public managers are accountable to the legislature, which in turn is accountable to the people, satisfies the requirement of democratic accountability.

Similar to the Wilsonian tradition, the Jeffersonian tradition also believes in the hierarchical accountability. The concept of limited government is the main pillar in the Jeffersonian tradition. The protection of individual autonomy through the idea of grass-roots government has been an overwhelming influence on public administration's theories and practices. Despite the Wilsonian and Jeffersonian's emphasis on hierarchical authority, many

public administration scholars have indicated the difficulty with such a position (Thompson, 1983). The assault on traditional thinking started with a series of critique by Herbert A. Simon and Robert A Dahl (Simon, 1946; Dahl, 1947). They criticized that traditional bureaucratic principles were inconsistent and unscientific. In addition, Waldo in his book *The Administrative State* (1948) lashed critically at traditional philosophy by pointing out that, “the indictment against public administration can only be that, at the theoretical level, it has contributed little to the solution or even the systematic statement of fundamental problems.” In 1961, he wrote that, “in many ways the classical theory was crude, presumptuous, incomplete-wrong in some of its conclusion, naïve in scientific methodology, and parochial in its outlook.” Similarly, Sayre (1951, 1958) like Waldo declared that traditional values such as politics-administration dichotomy, neutral competence, and control by administrative law obsolete. Finally, Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) reject traditional public administration principles as “hostile to discretion and to citizen involvement, uninvolved in policy, parochial, and narrowly focused on efficiency.” Given the unequivocal attack on traditional public administration, there has been a proliferation of movements that attempt to search for a formula that could reconcile the dilemma.

Post-traditional Intellectual Developments

The essential role of governmental bureaucracy in formulating and implementing public policies makes it a central player in a democratic nation. Bureaucratic actions basically constitute what government chooses to do or not to do. The original politics/administration dichotomy has clearly faded because of the increasing importance of civil servants in the policy-making processes. Public administration scholars have long recognized that bureaucracy has now become the center of political power and authority. They have a direct impact upon population because of their role in the decision-making and implementation processes (Weber, 1968; Peters, 1988; Thompson, 1961; Lenin, 1969; Kingsley, 1944; Herring, 1936; Appleby, 1949; Wright, 1974-75; Sutherland, 1993; Krislov, 1978; Kaufman, 1954, 1978; Friedrich, 1978; Finer, 1978). Similarly, Kranz (1976) contends that, “elected executives, legislators, and judges cannot be effective without bureaucracy, but bureaucrats can initiate, adopt, interpret, enforce, and ignore laws without the other branches.” The degree of administrative discretion required to implement public policy stands in stark contrast to the requirement of democratic government of popular sovereignty. As a result, the delegation of policymaking authority to government agencies raises a serious dilemma in democratic societies. On the one hand, bureaucratic discretion is essential because lawmakers could not foresee all possible circumstances surrounding the application and execution of public laws. On the other hand, their lack of accountability from political pressure further constraint the ability of legislature to control bureaucratic behavior (Meier, 1993b; Mosher, 1982; Redford, 1969; Ripley and Franklin, 1991; Rourke, 1992). Consequently, bureaucrats are often called upon to make judgment based on their experience, expertise, and intuition, rather than on the interest of the public (Warmesley et. al 1990)

In addition, there is also a serious concern that certain agencies of government seem to develop a special relationship with special private interests, the very interests they were supposed to regulate, again suggest the inability of public agencies to ensure bureaucratic responsiveness and accountability to the public. Lowi (1969) argues that the exercise of discretion tends to neglect the larger public interest. As a result, he proposes a "juridical democracy" that enlists detailed legislative action designed to eliminate discretion. In addition to specific legislation and greater legislative review of administrative actions, other proposals have also been suggested to increase public accountability. Cooper (1982) discusses various roles, obligations, and objective responsibilities that limit the boundaries of administrative actions. Gawthrop (1984)'s system theory is a mechanism used for redesigning organizational structures to achieve bureaucratic responsiveness.

In addition, Gruber (1987) argues "bureaucracies pose a problem for democracy when they make governmental decisions—that is, public policy—and thereby short circuit electoral channels of public control." Similarly, Ziegler and Tucker (1978) argue that efficiency and responsiveness can only be maintained when policy initiative rests with the elected representative. Furthermore, economic-based approaches have also contributed to the search for democratic accountability. The principal-agent model that is widely used in economics, management, and sociology (Levinthal, 1988; Zucker, 1987) has become powerful new tools for assessing bureaucratic responsiveness in the relations between political superiors and bureaucrats. This model stipulates that the principals (executive and legislative) design incentives and sanctions to control administrators' behavior so that the behavior is always in conformity with the policy preferences of the principals (Woods and Waterman, 1993).

Finer (1972) has also argued for greater legislative control and increased supervision of administrative activities as a means of controlling bureaucrats. Fearing that bureaucrats' views become the dominant view of society, he recommends that legislature engage in detailed supervision of government agencies. Recent theoretical and empirical studies (Ferejohn and Shipan, 1990; Carpenter, 1996; Hamilton and Schroeder, 1994; Wood and Waterman, 1991, 1993) have all highlighted the utilization of mechanisms such as administrative procedures, appointment, budgets, and oversight hearings to enhance bureaucratic responsiveness in public agencies. Other empirical studies even indicate that many public administrators believe that elected officials should exercise some degrees of dominance over them (Green, 1982; Gruber, 1987).

Finally, the growing influence of democratic accountability model on the writings of administrative theories is due to its representative bureaucracy argument. Proponents of representative bureaucracy argue that bureaucratic decisions reflect the general will of the population if bureaucratic composition shares similar characteristics of the population such as geographical locations (Denhardt, 1992), social classes (Kingsley, 1944), and race or gender (Krislov, 1974).

Despite the substantial success all of these changes attract, they have also been attacked as unrealistic and irrelevant. This is particularly true when government agencies have increased in scale and complexities of their orientations. In addition, the limited time and expertise of executive and legislative reduce the ability of these two institutions to appropriately monitor agencies' behaviors. At the same time, the economic approach to increasing accountability has also come under heavy attack because it tends to undermine the importance of organization. Perrow (1986) postulates that the economic theories of organization should be dismissed because everything that "we value about human behavior—its spontaneity, unpredictability, selflessness, plurality of values, reciprocal influence, and resentment of domination—has disappeared." Similarly, Moe (1987) contends that bureaucracies have become "black boxes that mysteriously mediate between interests and outcomes." Finally, efficiency and accountability assessed through such mechanisms as fiscal integrity, congressional oversights, and detailed regulations only force bureaucrats to respond to executive and legislative instead of public preferences (Schumaker and Loomis, 1979).

The ineffectiveness of these approaches to ensure democratic accountability casts a new light in the debate about bureaucratic responsiveness. Now, scholars are grasping to look for measures that are necessary to supplant democratic accountability so that those measures can ensure a correspondence between the decisions of bureaucrats and the preferences of community. Such a debate leads to the development of bottom-up approach to accountability.

Contemporaneous Views

The influence of Hamilton and Madison's political philosophy on traditional organizational theory clearly delineates the importance of authority and hierarchy. However, substantial changes that have taken place in public agencies since the Second World War force public administration theorists and practitioners to reevaluate the relevance of top-down approach to ensure democratic accountability. For example, the reliance upon multi-organizational teams as well as partnership with non-governmental entities (Mosher, 1980; Salamon, 1981; Kettl, 1988) indicates that the nature of governmental operations stretches far beyond hierarchical authority. The growing dependency on private and non-profit organizations profoundly alters the traditional concept of administration. This new environment requires different strategies and tactics to ensure responsiveness and accountability (Smith, 1983)

In addition, the selection of efficiency as the primary value of public administration leads to the forms of organizational structures that are incongruent with the requirements of democracy (Waldo, 1948). Waldo's criticism stems from the fact that "autocracy at work is the unavoidable price for democracy." (1948) Hence, he presses for a more democratic mode of organization that involves "a substantial abandonment of the authority-submission, superordinate-subordinate thought patterns which tend to dominate our administrative theory." (1952) Similarly, Ostrom's public choice theory which is based on individual rationality views public agencies as the means for allocating goods and

services in accordance with the preferences of individuals in society, rather than as “bureaucratic units which perform those services which someone at the top instructs them to perform.” (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1971) As a result, he proposes a form of democratic institution, based on multi-organizational relationship and intentional fragmentation, as the only form of organizational design capable of achieving bureaucratic efficiency and responsiveness.

Furthermore, Denhardt’s (1984) assertion that substantial aspects of public policy have a tremendous impact on the lives of individuals in society further affirms the importance of democratic administration model in public administration theory and practices. In addition, Emmett Redford (1969) in his book *Democracy in the Administrative State* suggests that democracy rests on three important concepts: individuality, equality, and participation. His conception of participation includes “access to information, access to forms of decisions, ability to open any issue to public discussions, ability to assert one’s claim without fear of coercive retaliation, and consideration of all claims asserted.” His main thesis is basically that attainment of the democratic ideal in the field of administration depends upon the representation of diverse interests in the decision-making process.

Building upon these theoretical foundations, administrative theories have framed several approaches that relate to bottom-up accountability model. The first approach is participatory democracy (Leach, 1990; Ranson and Stewart, 1994). Public participation, a devised used to ensure correspondence between public policy and the wishes of the people became popular in the 1960s and 1970s. Originated in the “New Public Administration,” (Bellone, 1980; Frederickson, 1971; Marini, 1971; Waldo, 1971) this concept of citizen involvement widens the scope and context of political activity in the public service to include cooperative and consultative processes between civil servants and local citizens. The devolution of influence through a mechanism like decentralization seems to reinforce bureaucratic responsiveness and democratic accountability.

In addition, Osborne and Gaebler’s *Reinventing Government* (1992) was a direct critic to traditional administrative practice. As an alternative, they introduce a new form of governance that is “steering rather than rowing” and that satisfies the needs of customers, not the bureaucracy. By mandating citizen participation, public agencies become more responsive to the needs of citizens. The growing consumer movements highlight the crucial interconnections among public agencies, private citizens, and interest groups that are crucial to provide democratic legitimacy of public institutions in light of fragmented government (Lynn, Henrich, and Hill, 1999). In addition to this, the launching of the National Performance Review (NPR) by former President Clinton and former Vice President Al Gore in 1992 aimed at empowering lower level employees to exercise discretion as well as directing government agencies to initiate programs that are more responsive to citizens’ needs (Kettl, 1998).

The push for greater citizen participation in government decision-making started to gain widespread acceptance during the 1970s. The forms and practices of citizen participation range from advising agencies, attending hearings, serving on advisory committees, participating in focus groups to responding to citizen surveys (Gordon and Milakovich, 1998). Such kinds of active role are very essential to empower local communities to act in their own interests. Citizen participation represents the application of the decentralist principle, that assumes that delegation of authority to affected persons, and is the key principle to promote democratic accountability.

Theoretically, representative democracy through greater citizen participation seems to be the right approach to ensure bureaucratic responsiveness and accountability. Empirically, however, studies of citizen participation yield a mixed outcome such that participation requirements do not guarantee that policy decisions will reflect citizens' interests (Arnstein, 1969; Stykal, 1980; Wandersman, 1981; Jones, 1983; Plumlee, Sterling, and Kramer, 1985; Sheng, 1989). Scholars have attributed various reasons for such inconclusive evidences. First, for citizens the perceived costs of participating often outweigh the expected benefits. Because citizens often lack time and resources, their expected benefits often determine their participation (Kathlene and Martin, 1991). The cost-benefit analysis becomes more problematic when they lack confidence that they will benefit from participating, stemming from disillusionment with past government efforts (Hollensteiner, 1977; Savitch, 1994). In addition, the political structure in lower income communities often impedes the ability of these groups of citizens to participate. Some studies cite lack of representatives, lack of mechanisms to communicate, and higher ratio of problems to resources (Gittell, 1980; Sheng, 1989) as to why level of participation is low from these poor communities. What actually transpires is that citizens who do get involved are likely to come from middle class group, or citizens affiliated with special interest groups (Gittell, 1980; Yin and Yates, 1975; Berry, 1981).

Second, a common finding among participation studies is that bureaucrats are unwilling to relinquish their decision-making power. The expression of commitment to citizen empowerment and the actual opportunities for participation clearly represents a rhetorical incantation on the part of bureaucrats. The reasons for reluctance include paternalism, fear of delays, and preferences for expert knowledge over citizen lack of expertise (Jones, 1983; Kathlene and Martin, 1991; Hollensteiner, 1977). Finally, scholars have also raised concerns that reinvention movement leads to a "hollow state" (Bardach and Lesser, 1996; Milward, 1994) and accumulation of power among interest groups (Judd and Swanstrom, 1994; Malloy, 1991) that ultimately threatens citizen accountability. They were many attacks against the NPR on the grounds that its theoretical and philosophical foundation ignores the very nature of democratic government (Goodsell, 1993). Moe (1994) concurs this opinion by pointing out that the NPR fails to account for critical differences between the government and private sector, particularly on the premise that government is based on rule of law, not market-driven orientation. Similarly, Carrol (1995) argues that, "in treating government as a Wal-Mart, the NPR ignores the fact that many operational assumptions based on customer service have implications for broader systems of values such as the rule of law, representative government, separated and shared power, and individual liberty." As a result, these scholars have concluded that the market model of

administration as proposed by New Public Management “hinders any return to substantive democracy and thus limits the degree to which citizens can meaningfully affect policy and administration.” (Box; Marshall; Reed; and Reed, 2001)

Bottom-up accountability, in sum, has dramatically formed a major feature of democratic administration. Yet, similar to the fate of top-down accountability model, the gains it promises are not very encouraging. If anything, the model seems to be inconsistent with the very idea it seeks to accomplish, increasing bureaucratic efficiency and democratic accountability.

Constraints in Democratic Government

Democratic government requires popular sovereignty, equality of opportunity, and political accountability. Yet, debate over the meaning and scope of political participation is nothing new in a democracy. Questions that normally linger are who should participate, what ways is participation to occur, and are opportunities to participate should be afforded equally among interest groups? In addition to that, the meaning of accountability is also less clear. The issue of whom bureaucrats are actually accountable to is also a complex one, thus making them vulnerable to attack by both legislature/executive and private citizens. Furthermore, conceptual uncertainty about representativeness tends to result in the inclusion of one group over the other.

Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the larger concern is to ensure bureaucratic efficiency and democratic accountability amidst a diverse and rapidly changing society. The growing fear among the public that government actions take place without popular control and consent further complicates the task of bureaucrats to preserve democratic ideals in administration. In a pluralist democratic society, balancing contesting forces that equally have legitimate claims to democratic values is not an easy task for bureaucrats to perform. This is clearly the dilemma that continues to haunt both the practitioners and the theorists.

Conclusion

The extensive discussion of various models of accountability confirms my early contention that the evolution of public administration literature since the era of Woodrow Wilson until now has not been very successful in reconciling the dilemma of balancing bureaucratic efficiency and democratic accountability. Initially, the traditional channels of accountability that emphasize strict hierarchical control of authority dominate the development of theories in public administration. However, their alarming vagueness in ensuring efficiency and accountability leads to new forms of accountability that are more flexible and responsive to local citizens' needs. Yet, this bottom-up accountability model is also unsuccessful in promoting democratic values amidst spiraling complexities of governmental structures.

Other alternative approaches to accountability have also been practiced but yield similar outcomes. As a result, the overwhelming inconsistencies among all the models present a variety of moral dilemmas that typically confront public administrators. For example, what are their obligations to elected officials, administrative superiors and to the public generally? What happens when these obligations are in conflict with one another? How can administrators operate as efficiently as possible yet at the same time maintain democratic accountability? These concerns are critically important especially since there is a resurgent of interest among politicians, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens about the accountability deficit within new public management organizations. Debates and discussion regarding the role, scope, and effectiveness of the state and appropriate policies and institutions to further this role have taken place especially in the absence of a quantifiable definition of "good government." As a result, there has been a proliferation of studies that attempt to develop more robust models of accountability, which ultimately could ensure that efficiency and responsiveness can become complimentary goals, rather than mutually exclusive goals.

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